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AN EXAMINATION OF WILKERSON VS. RAHRER,
140 U. S. 545.
Kansas, by its constitution, provided that the manufarture and sale of intoxicating liquors should be forever probihited, exept for niedical, scientilfic and me*
chanical purposes. A statute of the state declared
guilty of a miisdemeanor any person who should manufacture sell, or barter "any intoxicating liquor." While
this statute was in existence, congress passed the socalled Wilson Bill, which became a law on August 8,
1890. On August 9, 1890, Pahrer, as agent for a Missouri firm, sold a keg of beer which had been brought
from Missouri for the purpose of sae. Rahrer was arrested by Wilkerson, sheriff, for violating tihe Kansas
law. He applied to the Circuit Court of the United
States for a habeas corpus, alleging that the Kansas
Act was, as to the sale that he had niad, in excess of
the state's legislative power. That court discharged
him, adopting his contention. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, that court held that
the arrest and punishment of Rahrer were within the
power of Kansas.
That the Circuit Court could discharge Rahrer, if
the state Act, under which he was held in custody, was

DICKINSON

LAW

REVIBIW

a violation of the Constitution -of the United States,
was not contested. But was it such a violation?
It penalized the act of selling, in the original -package by the importer, or his agent. an article of commerce brought into the state from another state. As to
such act, the statute when enacted was void. It remained void, until the enactment of the Wilson Act.
Did that Act give it validity? It provided that all in-toxicating liquors or liquids "transported into any state
or territory or remaining therein for use, consumption,
sale or storage therein, shall, upon arrival in such state
or territory be subject to the operation and effect of
the laws of such state or territory enacted in the exercise of its police powers, to the same extent and in the
same manner as though such liquids or liquors had been
produced in such state or territory, and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein
in original packages and otherwise."'
In virtue of this statute, in re Rahrer decides that
the -state law imposing a penalty on one who sells in
the original package a keg of beer, brought into the
state from another, is valid. How is this result reached?
Is the statute of congress to be regarded as imposing the penalty imposed by the state? If it can adopt
a state -law as its own, it must be one that it would be
competent for it to enact itself, so says Fuller, C. 3. He
adds: It must not be a law passed in the exercise of the
police power. But W hy? May not congress in fashioning its statutes, in the exercise of the commerce power,
the post office power, etc., be guided by the considerations which guide the exercise in the states of the police power? It can exclude lottery matter from the
fBarxei Fed. Code p. 2006. 8250.
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mails. 2 In the exercise of the interstate commerce
power, it can as do the states, in exercising their police
power, regulate the liability of carriers to their employes who are injured while engiaged in such commerce.3 In the exercise of the war power, it can interfere with the sales of intoxicantssa Why then can the congress not so exercise the
commerce power, as to compel those enaged in certain
forms of commerce, or in commerce in certain sorts of
things, to observe the wishes of the several states, as
expressed in their legislation?, It is an idle fancy of
an opinion writer that police considerations cannot influence the exercise of the substantive powers of congress.
But it is unnecessary to consider whether congress
could penalize acts done in violation of state laws, vhich
laws, as respects such acts, were in violation of the
Federal Constitution, for the Wilson Act does not profess to do so. Rahrer was not accused of violating a
law of the United States, but a law of Kansas. It was
necessary, in order to sustain a conviction to find that
the Kansas statute, as applied to his sale of the keg of
beer, was valid.
Can congress enlarge the powers of the states?
Having without the Wilson Act, no power to punish a
sale in the original package by the importer of imported beer, can congress bestow this power? The answer
re Rapier, 143 U. S. 110.
ASecond Employer's Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 264.
amilton vs. Kentucky Distilleries Company, 40 Super.
Ct., Rep. 106.
40f the cases cited by Fuller, C. J., Green vs. Barry, 15
Wall 610, has no relevancy. Nor has Cooley vs. Board, 12 How
299. U. S. vs. DeWitt 76 U. S. 41, holds sipmly that there is no
police power, (acting within a state) of the United States, when
it is not an ingredient of some other power.
21n

IICKI.NSON

LAW

REVIEW

given by Fuller, C. J., is "Nor can congress transfer
legislative powers to a state, nor sanction a state law in
violation of the Constitution." If, then, the Kansas
Act is vialid, it does not derive its validity from the
concession by congress, of the power to enact it.
In order to uphold the law, then, it is necessary to
find that there was power to pass it, independently of
the Wilson Act. Prior to this Act, Iowa had passed a
statute similar to that of Kansas, and as applied to an
import, from a state, it had been held unconstitutional.5 If, then, such a state law, before the enactment of
the Wilson Act, was unconstitutional and void, how
does it -happen that such a statute passed since the Wilson Act will sustain a conviction? Here is room for the
play of the subiety which is often so dear to the heart
of the justices of the supreme court.
There may be two kinds of state powerlessnes?.
The state may have no power at all, or it may have a
conditional power; that is, a power, When e. g. congress
has no will against its exercise, but a wait of power,
whenever congress has such will. So, the difficulty
furnished by the hypothesis that the Wilson Art has
enlarged the state's power; that is . has broadened the
area, over whidh it may operate, is evaded by the conception that it all along has the power, unless this power is obstructed by the will of congress.
And there are two kinds of wills of congress. The
explicit conscious will expressed constitutionally, that a
given kind of statute should not be enacted by a state,
may strip it, for the time, of its conditional powers.
But, there is also the unconscious will, which consists
in thinking nothing, enacting nothnig, but which nevertheless is an inhibition of what would otherwise be
within the competence of the state. Some kinds of
OLelcy vs. Hardin, M3U. S. 100.
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things the state can not do, even though the congress
is dumb with respects thereto. Other kinds of things,
such as pilotage, regulation of speed in interstate trains
regulating the naviguble streams the state may do,
until some inhibitory legislation 'has issued from congress. In such cases the law of the state loses its authority. But, it seems that Fuller, C. J., has discovered a third class of cases. The state may have no power to legislate in a certain way on a certain subject,
until an act of congress (not mere silence) removes
"obstacle" to the operation of tIhe state law. When
that "obstacle" is removed the will of the legislature of
the state becones efficient over the whole of the area
over which it intended to operate.
But, what is this obstacle? It is that the sale of
an import in the original package is an act of interstate commerce. Can congress abolish that fact? Can
it reverse the decisions of the courts as to what the
Constitution meant by commerce among the state? But,
that is precisely what it is doing if In re Rahrer is
correct. The Chief Justice says congress simply removed an impediment to the enforcement of the state laws
in respect to imported packages, but it removed the
impediment by legislatively saying that a sale which
was within the scope of the Federal commerce power,
and not within that of the states, should be treated by
the courts as within the latter; a heroic way, surely, of
overcon-dng an embarrassnent.
If the state's actual control of an interstate transaction can thus be secured, its control ovier any other such
transaction can be in a similar way secured. Congress
may abdicate its function of .regulation of international
and interstate commerce, by willing that "obstacles"
shall be removed to the state's control, by allowing
"imported property to fall at ornce upon arrival within
the local jurisdiction." C. J. Fuller professes to per-
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ceive no reason "why if congress chooses to provide
that certain designated subjects of interstate commerce
shall be governed by a rule which divests them of that
character at an earlier period of time than would otherwise be the case, it cannot do so;" that is, congress can
either make that not to be a subject of interstate commerce, which is sudh a subject, or it may subject interstate commerce to state action; that is, may widen,
in violation of the Constitution, the scope of the state's
power over commerce.
In Leisy, vs. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, deciding that
a state prohibitory law could not operate on a sale by
the importer of an original package, the same Chief
Justice, Fuller, prepared the way for the enactnent of
the Wilson bill, by saying that "a subject matter which
has been confided exclusively to congress by the Constitution is not within the jurisdiction of the police
power of the state, unless placed there by congressional
action." Again he says, "as the grant of the power to
regulate commerce among the states, so far as one
system is required, is exclusive, the states cannot exercise that power without the assent of congress, and,
in the absence of legislation, it is left for the courts to
determine when state action does or does not amount
to such exercise, or in other words, what is or is not a
regulation of such commerce."
Again he says "the responsibility is upon congress so far as the regulation of interstate commerce is
concerned, to remove the restriction upon the state in
dealing with imported articles of trade within its limits, which have not been mingled with the common
mass of property therein, if in its judgment the end to
be secured justifies and requires such action." If this
is correct doctrine, then the Constitution makers did
not intend that a central legislature should, to the exclusion of the state legislatures, manage international
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and interstate commerce. They only intended that the
central legislature should manage it, until it chose to
allow that management to the state legislatures. The
perspicacity of the recent justices who made this discovery of the intention of the men of 1787 is admirable. How astonishingly it transcends the vision of
the earlier justices who supposed that matters of interstate commerce, that were national in character, had
to be regulated by congress.
In in re Rahrer, there is still another doctrine to be
noticed. The Kansas act, tforbidding sales, all sales,
sales of imported liquors in original packages, as well
as others, was passed before the Wilson Act. As to
sales of sudh imported liquors, it was inoperative; it
was void. But, this partially void act of the state was
made entirely valid by the act of congress. Says Fuller,
C. J., "This is not the case of a law enacted in the unauthorized exercise of a power exclusively confided to
congress, but of a law which it was competent for the
state to pass but which could not operate upon articles
occupying a certain situation until the passage of the
act of congress." But, if congress has by the Constitution received the whole power to regulate interstate and
international commerce and the states have divested
themselves of such power, how can it be said that a
state law, in as far as it acts on interstate commerce,
is making an "authorized exercise" of a power. And
what power is that to regulate commerce, which cannot
regulate it? There are many prohibitions on state action. A state can not pass an ex post facto law. May
congress release it from this incapacity? May the inability of a state to pass laws ,impairing the obligation
of contracts. granting titles of nobility, be rerrgoved by
the will of congress?
The Constitution mentions several cases in which
the state may not legislate without the consent of con-
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If the mnkers of the Constitution when trans-

ferring from the states the power to regulate commerce
wiA h foreign nations, etc., intended to transfer it only
provisionally, only until congress should consent to the
exercise of it by the states, how regrettable that they
have not expressed this qualification, but have compelled the justices of the court to ferret -it out by the
exercise of prodigious acumen.
However, apparently thinking that an act void at
its passage by a state legislature, could not be made
valid ,byan act of congress, the court concludes that an
act not void, but incapable of operation, can by a later
act of congress be made capable of operation, so that a
conviction for its violation, could be secured.
The Chief Justice attempts to explain how the Act
of Congress gave operativeness to the state statute by
saying "Jurisdiction attached not in virtue of the law of
congress, but because the effect of the latter Was to
place the property where jurisdiction could attach."
The act of congress did not affect the place of the
property, the keg of beer. The place was determined
by the act of the owner. To say that congress places it
where the state's jurisdiction could attach, is simply
an evasive way of saying that congress made -operative
on the keg, and its Gale a statute of Kansas that was
previuosly not operative, by requiring -he courts to
conceive, to think, that the sale was not an act of interstate, but an act of intra-state comnmerce. The act is
simply a direction to the courts not to adhere to their
definition of commerce, or the definitions thereof, held
by the Constitution makers, but to adopt one Which
subjects interstate comnerce to state control, by ordaining that it shall be considered something that it is

not.
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Not to Will is to Will
Anong peculiar notions that appear in the discussions of the judges of the Supreme Court, is the
thought that congress wills by not willing. The Con-stitution enumerating the powers of congress, says,
"The congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes;
to borrow money; to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes," etc. This has been held to be a transfer
from the states to the central government, of this power. The power transferred is no longer in the state
from which it is taken, but in the United States, acting
by its organ, the congress. It would follow, that since
the power to regulate international and interstate commerce had been surrendered by the states, they could
no longer exercise it, and any state legislation, presupposing the existence of this power, would be void. Its
voidness could not be the result of the will of congress,
that it should not exist, but of the will of the states, in
ratifying the Constitution, that the power to enact it
should not any longer exist in them.
It is not to the credit of the Federal Courts, therefore, that after laying down the principles just stated,
they should think it conducive to conviction that the
states could not regulate interstate commerce, to aver
that the "failure of congress to make express regulations indicates its will that the subject shall be left free
from any restrictions or impositions, and any regulation of the subject by the states except in matters of
local concern." Robbins vs. Taxing District of Shelby
County, 120 U. S. 489. In re Rahre, 140 U. S. 545. In
the former of these cases, an imposing list of cases
making coincident decisions, or uttering consonant
dicta, is presented.
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In such cases it is unnecessary to find a will of
congress. The will of the makers of the Constitution
is, when discovered, enough, and there is no lack of
confidence manifested by the judges that they have
ascertained that will. Yet the justices of the supreme
court are infested with the notion that in some way it
:s the will of congress that takes from the states the
power to regulate interstate commerce. A specimen of
the hallucination is found in In re Rahrer, supra. After saying that the power of congress to regulate commerce among the states, when the subjects of that
power are national in their nature, is exclusive (that is,
exclusive of state power), the opinion adds: "The Constitution does not provide that interstate conmnerce
shall be free, but, by the grant of this exclusive power
to regulate it, it was left free except as congress Minght
impose restraint. Therefore, it has been determined
that the failure of congress to exercise this exclusive
power in any case is an expression of its will that the
subject shall be free from restrictions or impositions
upon it by the several states.

* * * And if a law pass-

ed by a state in the exercise of its-acknowledged powers
comes into conflict with that will, the congress and the,
state can not occupy the position of equal opposing
sovereignties, because the Constitution declares its supremacy and that of the laws in pursuance thereof."
Note the inconsequence of this language. (1) The
Constitution takes from the states the power to regulate interstate commerce. Hence, any attempted state
regulation is void; vid not because it clashes with the
will of congress, but because it is the pretended exercise of a non-existent power. But (2) even if the state
had the power, the "acknowledged power," its exercise
of it would be a nullity, if that exercise conflicted with
the will of congress, and the will of congress is expressed by doing nothing.
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But, this is a wholly inadmissible doctrine. Not
acting is not acting. Not thinking, not willing, is not
thinking or willing. Not legislating may be the result
of oblivion, inattention, indifference to the topic to be
lagislated upon. Not to will is not the same as to will,
though the will be that something shall not be.
But, how may congress constitutionally express its
will? Only by a writing, a statute or a resolution. The
Constitution says that every order, resolution or vote
to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of
Representatives may be necessary except on a question
of adjourmnent, shall be presented to the President of
the United States, and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by
him, shall be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and
House of Representatives, according to the Rules and
Limitations prescribed in the case of a bill," and every
bill must be presented to the President. If he approves,
he must sign it. The will of congress has no existence
except in bill, order, resolution, and is a nullity unless
and until it is presented to the President. How, then,
is a so-called "will" of congress, not written, not forraally voted, not submitted to the President, of any efficiency whatever? How can it nullify a power, which,
.but for it, the state legislatures would have? The allegation that it can is simply preposterous.
And the introduction of the notion that congress
by doing nothing acts was wholly unnecessary. Some
powers may coexist in state and United States. Some
powers may coexist., until the exercise of them, by the
United States, which exercise suspends, for the time
destroys, the simrlar power of the state. The state may
regulate pilotage, the rates of speed of railroad trains,
even when engaged in interstate commerce, etc., until
congress regulates them. When congress passes -a
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regulation, not by not acting, but by acting, the state's
power lapses. There are other powers which, originally in the states, were transferred .from them, by the
ratification of the Constitution, to the United States.
These powers are no longer in the states, and, hence
they can do nothing which presupposes their posession
of such powers. The power to say what articles, if of
commerce, shall enter the state, and be once sold in it
by the importer, is one of these dead powers. The noncontinuance of the power in the state, is the sole and
sufficient reason for the vdadness of 'any legislation
which could be valid only as an exertion of such power.
Yet, C. J. Fuller, in In re Rahrer, supra, after saying 4hat the power of congress to regulate comnerce
among the states, when the subjects of the power are
national in their nature, is exclusive (that is, exclusive
of a power to regulate it elsewhere, and therefore in the
states) ineptly adds that the failure of congress to
exercise this exclusive power, is an expression of its
will that the states, which have it not, shall not exercise it, as if any will of congress that a non-existent
power any where, should not be exercised, were necessary, and as if inaction could be sensibly construed into
action.1

3lCf. Clark Distilling Company vs. Western Maryland Rway.
Co. 242 U. IS. 311; Commonwealih vs. Jacobson, 72 Super. 38.
The Webib-Kenyon Act of Congress uf March 1, 1913.
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MOOT COURT
GALLOWAY vs. TRUST CO.
Trusts and Trustees-Trust for Settlor's Use-Reservation
Power to DtLapose by Will-Creditors-Attachmient.

of

STAfMMENT OF FACTS.
Mary Ansley a Widow 'with eight children, the oldest only
15 years of age, received from her husband (deceased) "0,000
in securities. She conveyed this to a trust company with the
understanding that she was to be paid the interest thereon,
without being able to touch the principal, the principal, however,
tobe paidat her death to her legatees, or in absence of a will to
her next of kin. Six years thereafter she asked Galloway for
a loan of $1,600, telling him his only security would be the
perEodic income from the trust. Galloway hesitated for a period
but dinally lent the money. Partial payments were made, but
$1,400 of the money remained unpaid. Galloway secured judgment for $1,450 against Mrs. Ansley and attached the funds in
the X Trust Company. The lower court decided that he can
compel the X Trust Oompany to pay him only the income, and
no -part of the trust itself.
H. Colen for plaintiff.
Beaver for defendant
OPINION OF THE APPELLATE COURT.
Caldwell J.-On first sight the only question presented in
this case is whether or not a person sui juri can place his
property beyond the reach of creditors -by placing it in a
trust fund 'which he is unable to touch during life, but retain
the power to dispose of it by will when he dies. Much has been
said on this question, as to how far the creator of the trust
may go in reserving to himself rights concerning the property
which he would protect frun creditors by placing it in a "spendthrift" trust. Whether or not the creator had the power to revoke the trust, or whether or not he had the right to convey the
trust funds at death without rendering the trust void as regards
creditors, -have all been discussed at great length in the books.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, however, in the late
case of Benedict vs. Benedict, 061 Pa. 118, has decided that in
order to make a trust of this nature valid as aga%st subse
quent creditors, the settlor must divest himself of all rights or
ownership in, and control over the property thus conveyed, re-

DICKINSON

LAW

REVIEW

serving to himself only the right to receive the income during
life. Otherwise the trust is void. The case further holds, concerning the retention of the right by the settlor to convey at
death, that this retention of authority renders the trust void.
the facts are practically identical with the case at bar.
Were we stating the law of Pennsylvania, under the peculiar facts in this case ,the court might be inclined to think differently from the law as laid down in Benedict vs. Benedict.
Here Mrs. Ansley specifically told Galloway that her money
was tied -up in a trust fund. She further infortned him that -he
could hope for no security other than the periodic payments of
interest. Galloway hesitated before lending the money. This
very fact shows that he was calculating the probabilities or receiving payment of the amount lent, from the periodic installments which Mrs. Ansley received. Was he not to a certain extent estopped from denying that he had lent the money knowing
that his sole security was the periodic income, that -the principal was tied up, and that he took his chance upon receiving
payment solely from the interest money which Mrs. Ansley received.
In our opinion Galloway -was in the position of a purchaser
with full notice. He did not lend the money unvalue
for
der the belief that Mrs. Ansley had ready access to the principal of her estate. He had been specifically warned to the contrary. It would seem to us that the ends of justice would be
best served by holding that the defendant Could recover -on the
security upon which he lent the money, namely the periodic payments.
Unfortunately for the defendant in this proceeding however, the law of Pennsylvania as laid down in Benedict vs.
Benedict, 261 Pa. 118, is binding upon this court and we must
therefore hold that the trust money in question is attachable for
the debt of the creator, Mrs. Ansley. In accordance with this
decision, the verdict of the learned court below holding the
money unattachable must -be

RT1ERSED.
OPR4NION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The opinion of the learned court below shows that it has
ample authority, prima fade, in the adjudication of the courts
of Pennsylvania, Nolan vs. Nolan, 218 Pa. 135; Benedict vs.
Benedict, 216 Pa. 118.
If Mary Ansley had retained absolute power over the
remainder after the life estate, she might be regarded as vir-
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tually owning the fee, with power to dispose of it. But she did
not have such absolute power. She could only dispose of it by
vill. The residue, after the life estate, could not be controlled
by her in such way as to become tributary to her own personal advantage. It had to go, either to the legatees, or to the next of
kin, and could not be converted into cash, by -her, by any means.
We have then, an -unchangeable dedication of the remainder,
after the life estate, to others than Mrs. Ansley. If she cannot
subject it to her interests directly, why should she do so indirectly, by contracting debts, and authorizing the creditors to
do so ?
That the conveyance was fraudulent as to Galloway, is an
inadtaissable proposition. Rather was he guilty of fraud, in not
.disclosing an intention to annul the trust estate if he
entertained it, -at the time of the loan or, in forming and attempting to execute that intention later. He taoitly
assented to the declaration that his only security could be the
periodic income, when he permitted Mrs. Ansley to take the
loan, under the belief that the corpus of the trust was exempt
from executions, and that he assented to its exemption.
We think, had the learned court not decided that it would
be to assist Galloway to perpetrate a fraud to sustain his attachment, it could not -be convicted of taking an unsound posi-

tion.
We shall, -however, affirm 'its decision, in defference to the
silence of the courts, as to the effect of a similar set of facts.
AFFIRMED.
,COMMONWEALTH

vs. INMAN.

Arson-Evidence of a Subsequent Distinct Criminal Act, but
Connected 2n Character and Purpose with the Offense
Charged, is Admissable.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Inman is on trial for firing a house on July 27. That ha.
did the act was proven by circumstances. One of these was
that five days after, viz: August 1, he attempted to set fire to
the house. Defendant objected to proof of a second crime -at the
trial for another. The court admitted the evidence.
Doi, J.-It is a general rule that a subsequent criminal act
is not admissible on trial for the first crime. However, if the
second crime is connected in character and purpose with the
offence charged, such evidence is admissible. That Inman had
an intent to bUrn the house is elearly shown by his attemVt to
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burn the house. The fact that he did attempt to burn the house
five days after, is connected with the first crime In that there
is continuity of Intent and purpose. The admission of this evidence does not necessarily mean that he is guilty of the first
crime. It is admitted for the jury to weigh such evidence.
If the defendant's attempt was absolutely disconnected with
the -burning of the house, for exainple, if he had -attempted to
kill a man, or steal a horse, such evidence is not admissible on
trial for the charge of arson. Here, a house is burned and five
days later, the defendant is caug1ht, attempting to burn the
house. He may not be the one who burned -the house on July 27
but the fact that he attempted to burn the house is of such a
similar character, and because it shows the defendant's intent to
burn this house, it is admissible. It was so held in Kramer vs.
The Connonwealth, 87 Pa. 299. The facts of the case just cited
are exactly identical wit the facts of the case at bar.
ANY EVIDENCE), either before or afterwards, .to show
purpose in the mind of the defendant to destroy this house is
admissible.
EYiOEPTIONS OVRRTJIfD.
OPINION OF TIM

SUPERIOR COURT.

The second attempt to burn the house was not proved to show
a tendency to commit arson generally, but to show a purpose
to destroy the particular house by fire. If this purpose existed
on August 1, it not dmlprdbably existed five days before. There
is an improbability that two persons conceived the purpose,
vithin the space of five days, to burn the same house. Hence,
the attempt on August 1, was a relevant piece of evidence and
admissible.
The judgmnent of the learned court below must be
AFFIRMED.
STOKES vs. BLAINE
Negotiable Instrument-Bill or Note Given as Collater-al Security Makes Indorsee Bona Fide Holder for Value--Where
Note is Due Before Maturity Bearer Must Sue and May
Hold Proceeds.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
To Stokes, X was indebted $500. X had a note of Blaine'sfor
$1000 which he transferred to Stokes for collateral security.
This note was payable on July 10, 1916, suit is brought Septembr 11, 1918. X'Ws debt does -ot mature until May 7, 1919. X
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has objected to the suit until his own debt becomes due. Stokes
contends that he -has a right to the $1,000.
Smith for plaintiff.
Stevens for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
'Wafield, J.-The facts in ths case are: To Stokes X was
indebted $500. X 'had a note of Blaine's for 41,000, which he
transferred to Stokes :For collateral security. This note was payalbe on July 10, 1918, suit is brought -September 11, 1918. X's
debt does not mature until May 7, 1M19. X has objected to the
suit until his own debt becomes dve. Stokes contends that he
has a right to sue now, and that he has a right to the $1,000.
The questions presented under this set of facts are: irst,
has the plaintiff, Stoeks, a right to sue on the note at this
time? And, second, has he a right to the $1,000 until the maturity of the original debt?
As for the first question we are of opinion that the plaintiff may sue on the note given as collateral security at any
time after it becomes due. The bill or note of a third party given
as collateral security and indorsed to the creditor, for a debt
contracted at the time of such ihdorsement, makes the dndorsee
a 'bone fide holder for value in the usual course of business and
entitles him to protection against equities, setoffs, and other
forms of defenses avallable between antecedent parties. And the
same -principle applies -when the note is payable to bearer, and
is transferred to creditor by delivery. Daniels on Neg. dnst. 771.
24 Dickinson Law Review 71, states, "Where B, before the
maturity of the note, endorsed it to X, X then bec~ane a holder
for value, and could enforce the note, even if B had not been
able to enforce it." This same doctrine i's to be found in Miller
vs. Pollock 41 Pa. 214, which is cited by the above author.
The original maker of the note is under obligation to pay
the note when it becomes due and to make such payment to
the holder of the note 'whoever that may be. Justice Sergeant
in Li~hy vs. O'Brien, 4 Watts 141, says, "it'is 4res inter alios
acta,' With which -he has nothing to do. His duty is to fulfill his
contract by paying the legal holder." This doctrine is reiterated
by Justice Mastrazat in 199 Pa. 17, hn Delaware County Trust,
Safe Deposit and Title Insurance Company vs. Haser.
Question two then is as to the use to which the proceeds of
the note shall be placed. The proceeds of the note are still the
collateral security for the debt and we do not think that it
would be in the power of the Indorser to recall the security
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merely because of its change of form. fThe debtor has received
the advantage of shifting the duties of holder on the indorsee
and has thus received an advantage which is good consideration
in itself even if the plaintiff did not forgo anything in the way
of watchfulness and concern about his debtor that he would
otherwise have exercised. If the debtor cared to give such collateral security for his debt and the creditor accepted it at' the
debtor's rword it is for the debtor and not the creditor to suffer.
Dan. Neg. Inst. 7.73.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The collateral note matured before the note representing
the debt. Did this fact prevent suit upon -t until the latter note
became suable? The court has rightly answered negatively. The
note was enforceable according to its own terms. Blaine could
not take advantage of the fact that Stokes held it, not as absolute owner but merely as security; Of, Overton vs. Taylor,
31 Pa, 346, an example of suit on a collateral note, before the
maturing of the principal note.
The second question has been properly answered by the
learned trial court. The $1,000 note is a unit. It cannot be broken
into two parts, one to be enforced by Stokes, and the other
later by X. ,Stokes has a right to receive the whole amount.
Indeed as custodian of the note circumstances might require
him to sue on it, on the first opportunity, neglect to do which,
would make him liable for any ensuing loss to X.
If Stokes obtains $1,000 from Blaine he will be liable to
account for the surplus. He will be a trustee of the surplus for
X. Camden Nat. Bank vs. Freis-Breslin 'o., 214 Pa. 395.
The judgment of the learned court -below is
AFFIRMED.
HARPER vs. SUMMERS
Evidence-Witnesses-Party Dead.

Act May 23, 1887.

STATKffMANT OF FACTS.
Three days before X's death, while he was in good health,
X permitted Summers to take into his possession an automobile. Summers was a nephew. After X's death, Harper, his executor, claiming that the automobile was'a part of X's estate,
brought this replevin. Summers alleges that X gave the automobile to him. His own testimony was rejected. That of his
wife was received to prove the gift, Harper proved a statement
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by X, made severally to three persons that he -had lent the automobile to Summers for a month. The court told the jury that a
mere preponderance of evidence for the gift 'was not enough.
Verdict for Harper. Motion to set aside ifor new trial
Barnhart for Plaintiff.
Stapleton for Defendant.
Coglizer, J.-The main question in this case is whether or
not the charge of -the court was correct. The jury was instructed that mere preponderance of evidence for the gft -was not
enough. The attorney for the defense contends that the law laid
down in the charge to the jury -is -incorrect and cites a Nebraska
case, Wylie vs. Charlton, 43 Nebr. 840, as being the authority
that a preponderance of evidence is sufficient to establish a
parole gift of land and at need not be established beyond a
doubt. This, -however, is not the law kn Pennsylvania.
As a general rule to establish a gift inter vivos there must
be a preponderance of clear, explicit and convincing evidence in
support of every element needed to constitute a valid gift.
In Scott vs. Reed, 153 Pa. 14, Justice ,Hendrick says, "Where
an alleged donor has been surrounded durnig his last sitlkness
by the Tamily and relatives of the alleged donee and. the claim
ant has had opportunities to obtain possession of the subject of
the alleged gift without title, the proof in support of the claim
ougfht to be clear and satisfactory upon every point essential to
title by gift."
It s necessary by this kind of evidence to establish competancy of donor, delivery, acceptance and the parting by the
owner with bis control or right of dominion over the subject of
the gift. This rule is especially applicable when the gft is not
asserted until after the donor's death.
In Fiscus' Estate, 13 Pa. Super. 615, it was held that, to establish a gift inter vivos after the death of the alleged donor,
requires clear and satisfactory evidence upon every point es-,
sential to title by gift.
When competency of the donor, delivery, acceptance, aud
the parting by the owner with his control or right of dominlon
over the subject of the gift, have all been established, there is
something more than "a mere preponderance of evidence."
It is :not necessary for us to decide whether all the elements
of a gift were present. This matter has already been settled.
The correctness of the court's instruction is the only matter
that need be considered. In our opinion the instruction was correct. Motion to set aside for -new trial
REFUSED.
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OPNION OF ME SUPREME COURT.
The alleged gift of the automobile occured in the life time
of X. He has since died, Claim of the automobile is made after
his death, by the supposititous donee.
The donee's testimony was properly rejected un obedience
to the Act of 1887. He was made incompetent by X's death. The
fact that ntade him incompetent also made his -wife incompetent. Bitner vs. Boone, 128 Pa. 7.; Paschhel vs. Fels, 207, Pa.
567; Henry, Trial Evidence p. 417. The error of. admitting her
testimony has been dileted by the verdict in favor ot Harper.
The jury has disbelieved the testimony of Summers' 1wife.
The statement of X, thrice made, that he had lent the automoble to Snmumers, was not admissible. It was self. regardIng, made in the absence of Summers. No objection, however,
seems to -have been made to dt.
The trial court held that a 'mere preponderance ol evidence
was enough to establish the alleged gift. This seems inconuistent 'with the doctrine that the evidence, When the donor is
dead , must be clear, and satisfactory. Fross Appeal, 105 Pa.
258; 'Wise's Estate, 182 Pa. 168. "A mere preponderance of
evidence," says Stewart, J., "will not suffice to sustain a gift
where the question arises after the death of the alleged donor."
Smith's Estate, 237 Pa. 115. It is necessary then that the judgment of the learned court below be
RENEWED.
ESTATE OF JEPFERSON
Real Property-Mortgages-Construction of Words "Under and
Subject to" the Mortgage-Act of June 12, 1878, P. L. 205Rights of Vendor-Personal Liability of Vendee for Mortgage
STATEMENT OF FAGTS.
Adamson owned a tract on which he had placed a mortgage
of $4,000. He bad also given a bond for that amount. He estimated the tract worth $4,OO and sold it to Jefferson for $4,000,
"under and subject" to the mortgage. Later the tract was sold
in fboicosure of the mortgage for $2,500. Adamson, to avoid suit
on the bond, had to pay and did pay $1,500 to the mortgagee.
Jefferson having died, and hfe estate undergoing distribution,
Adamson claims the $1,500.
Segal for the plaintiff.
MecDonough for the defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COMRT.
Schnee, J.-Counsel for the defendant contends that the
defendant is relieved from liability to reimburse the plaintiff,
for the amount 'viich the latter was compelled to pay in satis-

faction of his bond, by virtue of the Act of June 12, 1878, P. L.
205. This is not an action between the holder of the incumberance and the grantee who took title subject to that encumbrance.
The Act of 1878 applies to the relations between the grantee
and the holder of the incumbrance; it does not affect the covenant of the grantee to protect the grantor against loss through
bis personal liability for -the debt to which the conveyance of
the land has been made subject; eday's Estate, 218 Pa. 64. "The
words under and subject' in a conveyance import that the
grantee takes the land subject to an incumbrance, the amount
of which has been deducted from the agreed price and the
covenant to be inferred from it is -that of indemnity for the
protection of the grantor" Faulkner vs. McHenry, 235 Pa. 298.
This lis not a covenant that the grantee will be personally liable
for the debt, nor is it a covenant that he will indemnify the
grantor against loss by reason of the existence of the incumbrance; Tritten's Estate, 238 Pa. 555. The incumbrance, to which
the land was by the conveyance made subject, was a part of the
consideration for the grant and the covenant of indemnity for
the protection of -the grantor was as much a continuing liability
as an obligation to pay a fixed sum of money; it should be discharged only by compliance with its terms; Kirker vs. Wylie,
207 Pa. 511. A vendee or grantee of property taken expressly
subject to a mortgage makes -the debt his own; and if, on sale
upon the mortgage there is a deficiency which the vendor is
obliged to pay on is bond, -he mnay recover in an action against
the vendee; 70 Pa. Supdrior Court 673; 160 Pa. 191; 88 Pa. 450;
49 Pa. 618. Trickett, in Dickinson Law Review, Vol. XVIII,
page 170, in the case of Sargeant vs. Myers, holds the following: 4he decisions thus far pronounced on the Act of 1678
have -left at absolutely unintelligble. They and it should be
eliminated by new legislation. Meantime we must hold that the
Act of 1878 applies to the grantee and the holder of the incumbrance only, and not to the grantor and grantee."
In view of the above facts judgment is for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURTr.
When Jefferson bought the land "under and subject to" the
mortgage, he indicated (a) that he was aware of the charge on
the land and assumed the risk of its being sold for it. But he
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did more. He agreed (b) to indemnify his vendor, Adamson,
against any liability by reason of that debt. May's Estate, 218
-Pa. 64. The indemnity was not conditioned upon the ability of
the land to repay the vendor. It was a personal charge. Hence,
the sale of the land having left $1,500 of the debt unpaid, for
which, on his bond, Adamson was liable, he had the right to .pay
this amount and have recourse for repayment to the guaranty. Land to the value of $1,500 had been put into the possession
of Jefferson who was not to pay for it, except when it became
necessary to pay it, in order to protect Adamson. When he pays
it, he merely completes the-payment of the purchase price,
which he had contracted to pay.
Jefferson has died and his personal estate is undergoing
distribution. Adamson, as a creditor, is claiming from the
funds. He has a right to be paid. The learned court, below has
properly held that he must be paid. Hence its decree must be affirmed, and the, appeal therefrom
DISMUSD.
ARMSTRONG vs. KOUNIZ
Contracts - Real Property - Partial Performance -- ,EjectmentFailure to Pass Good Title as Warranted; Amount of Money
to be Returned.
STATEMENT OF FA(S.
Asmstroag made a -written contract to convey a farm to
Kountz for $5,000 and to warrant the title. Kountz -adhered and
on four installments paid $3,000 of the purchase price. He then
ciscovered a defect in the title, which -he notified Armstrong to
remove, but which was not done. Two years have elapsed since
the last instalment of the price should have been paid, but
$2,000 remains unpaid. This is an action to recover possession.
Bartram for plaintiff.
Shelley for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
question to be decided in this case is,
J.-The
(McCready,
whether or not, a vendor who had made a written contract with
a vendee for sale of land and to warrant title, can eject the
vendee and recover possession when the vendee, after making
partial payments, stops further payments because of a defect in
title which he has discovered and notified vendor of, but the
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vendor has faled to remove the defect or refund the partial
payment 'of purchase price.
The vendor contracted by written agreement to make a
good and sufficient title to the vendee in consideration of the
purchase money, agreed by the latter to be paid. But upon discovery of a defect in title and notification of the defect by the
vendee to the vendor, when part of the purchase price was paid, the
vendor failed to prove to the satisfaction of the vendee 'that he
held a marketable title and that he could fulfill his part of the
contract entered into.
In Holmes vs. Woods end Frew, 168 Pa. 530, it is held that
a doubtful title which exposes the holder of it to litigation is
not marketable, and the rule in equity Is, that the purchaser
will not be compelled to accept it. Since the vendee did not 'have
to accept the title and the vendor did not tender payment to
-vendee, of the part purchakse price paid by him, he cannot maintainan action of ejectment against the vendee because in Nicol vs.
Carr, 35 Pa. 381, it clearly states that if a vendor cannot make
such a title as the vendee is bound to accept, he must refund
what has been paid and bring an action of ejectiment. The point of
law evoked in this oase is sustained in the following citations:
Erwin vs. Meyers, 46 Pa. 111; Freetly vs. Barnhart, 51 Pa.
281; Youngman vs. Idnn, 52 Pa. 418; Graver vs. Scott, 80 Pa. 03;
Herzberg vs. Irwin, 92 Pa. 49; Mitchell vs. Steinmetz, 97 Pa. 254;
Herman vs. Somers, 158 Pa. 428.
The latest citation on the point is that of Holmes vs. Fulton,
393 Pa. 27-1.
We are of the opinion that the vendee cannot be ejected, nor
that possession can be recovered by the vendor until he has returned the part purchase price paid by the vendee and at that
time he may bring an action of ejectment.
Verdict for defendant.
OPINION OF TJMi SUPR ME COURT.
Iountz refuses to pay the remainder of the purchase
money agreed upon, because of the defect of Armstrong's title.
He contracted for a -good title. A vendee cannot 'be compelled to
pay the contract price, f the title he expected to obtain cannot 'be passed to him by the conveyance.
The vendee, on discovering the defect of title, may refuse
to complete performance; but if he does so, he must surrender
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possession. He cannot keep for nothing, land which he agreed
to pay for, because the -title is not as good as he hoped for. He
must pay or give up the possession. The vendor may expel him
by ejectment.
A further time -will ,be extended for payment, however, a
grace specified in the verdict. If payment in that time is made,
posses$ion may -be retained. If it is not made, the judgment for
the verdict -becomes absolute, and a lhabere facias possessionem
will issue on dt, under which the vendee will be expelled. All
his rights in the land will be extinct.
But in this case, $3,000 has been paid by the vendee before
the discovery of the badness of the title. The vendor in two
years after notice, has faied to rectify the defect. It would be
inequitable to expel the vendee until the money paid 'by him
has been returned. He has 'had possession of the land for some
years. So much of the value of this possession as exceeds the
interest on the money paid to Armstrong, should be deducted
from the $3,000 and the judgment for Armstrong should be
conditioned on his paying the balance -back to Kountz.
As the judgment below is unconditionally for the defendant,
it -must be reversed, and a venire fadias de novo awarded.
REVEWED.
PATT.oN vs. DODGE
Master and Servant-Recovery of Judgment Against Servant
No Bar to Action Against Master Where Servant has not
Satisfied Judgment-Torts.
STATEMENT OF PA(YTS.
Thne plaintlff was injured by the chauffeur of the defendant
Previous to this action the defendant had brought suit against
the chauffeur and obtained a judgment for $500. This judgment
not being satisfied, plaintiff -brings this action against the defendant as master of the chauffeur. Defendant claims that judgment against the chauffeur is a bar to this actiin.
OPINIO(N OF THE COURr.
Marcus, J.-A judgment for $500 was obtained against the
chauffeur. To this there is no dispute. The dispute, however,
arises when the plaintiff, not being able to secure satisfaction of
the judgment teeks to sue and obtain judgment against the master.
Two questions arise. First. Was the Injury inflicted during
the course of the chauffeur's line of duty? Second. Having al-
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ready obtained a judngment against the servant, can the injured
party sue and obtain a judgment against the master?
Since there is no evidence to the contrary, it must be presned that the chauffeur was performing a part of his duties
-when the accident happened. Although there are many cases of
joy riding and loose ihandling of machines -without the authority
of the owner, yet we must not place a misdeed against a servant unless it is showed to be so by evidence. There is but one
remaining point to be answered.
It is a well known rule and principal of law that a master
is liable for the acts of his servant, com~mitted whle in the
performance of his duties. Yet this does not exempt the servant from -liability. Both being liable there is no doubt that judgment could be obtained by suing one or the other. It seems that
one was sued and judgment could not be obtained. What remedy
then is the injured party to have? Is he to lose because of the
failure to obtain a satisfaction of judgment of one of two guilty
persons? Of these two, the servant should really be considered
secondarily liable. Why then should not the plaintiff be able to
sue the prinaxily liable party?
It is the practice of Pennsylvania, which allows a plaintiff
to sue one, all, and several individuals who are joint tort feasors
and obtain a verdict and judgment against one, several or all
for the same tort, 200 Pa. 148, although only one satisfaction
may be obtained.
Why then can we not consider master and servant in the
same relative position as joint tort feasors, for the circumstances are similar? Surely then the master being just as
liable as the servant, the injured party is eaitled to a satisfaction. And therefore may sue and obtain judgment and execution
against the master.
Verdict for plakitiff.
OPINION OF

MflHE SUPREME COURT.

The question is: Aifter a judgment has been obtained against
a chauffeur for injury to the plaintiff, and an execution thereon
has failed to obtain any satisfaction, can the principal be sued
for the same injury?
The English rule, says Jaggard, on Torts, p. 341, is that a
judgment against one of the several tort-feasors is a bar to an
action against the others, although the judgment ds not satisfied.
The explanation is inappreciable.
The American rule is said to be different. The judgment
against one tort-feasor is no bar to an action against the others.
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Belcher vs. McChesney, 255 Pa. 394, introduces perplexity
and doubt. There, 'a judgment' dor $771 had been obtained
against the .enploye. A suit was then brought against the employer. He offered the judgment in evidence, not 'as a bar to a
recovery, -but for the purpose of limiting the amount to be received to $771. The court excluded the evidence, with the result that the verdict was t$4,750.
The Supreme Court reversed for the exclusion of the judgment. Some of the language used seem to imply that the fact
that a judgment had been recovered, though mot paid, barred
any action against the enployer, that is, to adopt the English
rule. Further elucidation ft necessary, we think, before a reversion to the English ;doctrine can be definitely justified.
Only the barest technicality can be urged in its support. It
is fair that the master should respond for injuries caused by
his servant in the course of the master's business. It is preposterous to say that the master's liability should -be expunged
by the previous action against the servant, issuing in judgment,
but not in satisfaction.
We think the judgment of the learned court below must -be
AFFIaiMED.
RIGGS vs. TERHUNE
Principal and Agent--Real Estate Broker-Assumpsit to Recover Commission Upon the Sale of Real Estate.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Terhune, desiring to sell a house for $10,000, employed
Riggs, a real estate broker, to find a ipurchaser, for a commission of three per cent. Riggs directed the attention of Harrison
to the property. After certain deliberation, Harrison decided
not to buy at that price, and so notified Riggs. Six weeks later
he learned that an objectionable building nearby, was to be torn
down. He, then not having any further communication with
Riggs, applied to Terhune, who demanded $11,000, which Harrison agreed to pay; and the house was conveyed to him. Riggs
sues for a commission of $300.
Shelley for plaintiff.
Davis for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Chylak, J.-The question was whether, under the contract
between the parties, it was the right of the defendant at his
will, to terminate the arrangement into which they had entered,
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and to dischazge the plaintiff trom his employment. If it was,
there can be no 'recovery in this action, for the plaintiff was
discharged before anything had been earned, according. to terms
of agreement. It is clearly shown in White vs. Benton, 96 N. W.
876, that a sale by the owner or principal revoked the broker's
authority, and gave him constructive noticealthough actual notice
of the sale was not given or communicated to the broker. It will
be sufficient to make clear our views, to call attention to a few
of the authorities which we regard as controlling upon the subject. See Storey on Agency 481, Ahren vs, Baker, (Mhnn) 24
N. W. 34; Goldsmith vs. Cook, 14 N. Y. Sup. 879; Gilbert vs.
Holmes, 64 Ill. 548. We quote from Story as follows: "A revocation by operation of law mzty be by a change of condition or
of a state producing an incapacity of either party. This proceeds
upon the general rule of law that the derivative authority expires with the original authority from which it proceeds. The
power of continuing in agency is founded upon the right of the
principal to do the business bimiseif and when that right -ceases,
the right to create an appointment or continuing the appointment of an agent already made for the same purpose, must
cease also. In short the derivative cannot generally amount to
more or exist longer than the original authority. In Ahren vs.
Baker, which, like the case before us 'was an action -to recoverTeal estate comnmission, it is said, "A revocation may be shown by
the death of the printipal, the destruction of theaubject retter, *r
the determination of the estate by sale, as well as by express
notice." In Pepper and Lewis digest p. 2221, Vol. 2, we find
'T~here b broker is employed to sell land for his principal, and
there is no stipulation in the contract as to theduration of the
broker's employment, the principal may terninate the employment
at anytime and discharge the broker.' Inaddtiontweedte a case
on point, 46 Pa. 426, holding, "where one, as an agent for another, contracts to sell the lands of the latter for a consideration
and there is no stipulation in the contract as to the duration of employment, the principal has the right to terminate it at any time
and discharge the agent :rom his services without notice." This
case does not show that the agent or broker was the procuifng
cause of the sale. In Gibbons vs. Monongahela River Consolidated Coal Company, 68 Superior 232, it is held that to -ntitle a
broker to recover a commission for the sale of real property he
must establish that be iwas the procuring cause of the sale. according to the contract. This is usually a question of :act for
the jury.
In order to recover Ina case like this, the plaintiff must show
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his employment, that the sale was made through his instrumentality and the thing sold, the terons of the sale, and person to
whom it was made were all in accordance with the terms of his contract of his employment. In support we cite, Seanuel vs. Luckenbach, 205 Pa. 428; 329 Pa. 180; Kifer vs. Yoder, 189'Pa. 305; Mayer
vs. Rhoads, 135 Pa. 601; Henderson vs. Sonmehon, 30 Pa. Sup.
Cb. 182. In & certain sense it may be true that the purchase
was in consequence of the broker's showing him the property,
but for that, the -purchaser may never have looked at the property nor entertaied a thought of buying it at the time the
broker told the purchaser about property in question; but in
this case the evidence shows that It was at 'least due to another, distinct, and separate cause, viz, the objectionable building and that it would be contrary to -law -to permit the -broker
to recover. The simple answer as to his demand was that if the
evidence was believed he did not cause the sale, that is, his
agency was not the immediate and efficlent cause of the sale
and the law regards only proximate and not remote causes, Earp
vs. 'Cummins, 54 Pa. 394; Kifer vs. Yoder, 198 Pa. 308; Hartley
vs. Anderson, 160 Pa. 39; 48 Superior 382 (p. 386), Barrow vs.
Newton.
In 172 Pa. 696, in the trial of the case the court charged
the jury that as there had been no time fixed by the original
agreement within which a sale should be effected, the plaintiff
had a reasonable time within 'which to secure a purchaser and
that the defendant could not within that time revoke his agency
and relieve themselves of liability to pay the commission agreed
upon. The case accordingly was decided in favor of the- plaintiff.
Upon Appeal to the supreme court, the case was reversed
and decided Efor the defendant, thus repudiating the above rule
and laying down the principle that the principal could revoke
even before a reasonable time had elasped, without incurring
liability for the payment of the commission.
And what is a reasonable time is a question for the jury.
rrhe -plaintiff undertook not a continuous employment but
an ageney to sell land. Such contracts are revokable at pleasure.
unless the power to revoke is restrained by express stipulation or
unless g'iven for a valuable consideration.
We are therefore of the opinion that, under the contract of
theparties, the defendant had the xight to discharge the plaintiff
from his services at any time. The plaintiff cannot recover in his
action, and we therefore order that the plaintiff be non-suited.
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OPMON OF THE SU REMB O0URT.
Much energy has been expended by the learned court below in maintaining that the employment of RPggs was terminable at the option of Terhune, the defendant. We discover in the
case, no evidence of an attempt to terminate it. The sole question is, did Riggs do that for 'which the coxmpission was promised him?
What was that? Terhune employbd Riggs to find a purchaser at $10,000. For this he 'was to get the commission. The
inquiry then is, did he find the purchasrer? He directed Harrison's attention to the house. Harison might have purchased, as
a result of this direction, but he did not. After certain deliberation, he decided not to buy at the price. He not only did not
buy; he notified Riggs of his refusal. At this stage, then, there
has been no earning of the comnmission, because there has been
no finding of a purchaser.
Six wleeks elapse So far as appears, Riggs makes no
further attempt to find a buyer. He sees no other person, and
he does not again communicate with Harrison.
Within these six weks, howeer, another influence begins
to work on flarrison's mind. A deterrent of the purchase of the
house was a nearby objectiibnable building. This building was to
-be torn down by its ownler. Did Riggs have any agency in its
demolition? No. This abolishment of the offending edifice, it is,
that made Terhuie's house, for the first tire, seem to Harrison desirable, -so desirable indeed that he was willing to pay the
larger price (*11,000) 'vWich Terhune then demanded. Although
the calling of the house to thfe attention of Harrison may have
some agency in influencing the further sale, it was plainly insufficient to effect that sale. It resulted, intediately, in a declination.
Another influence had to intervene, to generate the volition to
buy in Harrison, an influence with which Riggs had no connection. Earp m. Cunsins, 54 Pa. 394; Barrow vs. Newton, 48
Superior 382, are apposite authorities. By also, Kefer vs. Yoder,
198 Pa. 308. Hartley vs. Anderson, 150 Pa. 991, are cases where
the precedence of negotiation by the owner, with the buyer, to
those of thle agent, induced the decision that those of the agent
were not the cause of the buyer's purpose to purchase.
The actual purchase by Harrison was not the act which
Riggs was employed to affect. That was the purehade for $10,000 of the house, neighbored as it was by the repulsive structure. This Harrison rejected. The house he bought 'was not disfigured and depreciated by this structure; it was worth several
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hundreds of dollars more, and Harrison bougiht it for $11,000.
The conclusion then is, that Riggs did not find a buyer,
either for $10,000, or at any price, and therefore that Tiggs
has not earned his commission.
The judgment of the learned court below is
AFFER-MeD.
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